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Empirical Descriptions of Criminal 
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1 Introduction
There is nothing new about using empirical social science in the realm of sentencing 
law and practice. Sentencing has employed empirical descriptions of crime and sanc-
tioning for centuries, just as law, crime, and punishment have been the subjects of so-
ciological analysis throughout modern time. The novelty – if any – lies in the volume 
and authority of empirical social scientific descriptions over the last half-century. Today, 
empirical social science is an indispensable part of administrating sentencing systems 
in the Scandinavian countries. Many sentencing policies are prepared with reference to 
empirical accounts of sentencing practices and problems. Empirical descriptions of legal 
decision-making processes are more frequent, and empirical surveys of public and user 
attitudes towards sentencing decision-making, its quality and efficiency, have become 
integral parts of organisational management in local, regional, and national jurisdictions.
Empirical social science is used in many different ways with regards to sentencing. 
First, it is used to explain the causes, interpretive frameworks, as well as the consequences 
of sentencing law and practice.1 What are the causes and the effects of the use of medi-
ation and other alternatives? What is the explanation of the changing regulatory tech-
niques employed in sentencing law? Are they reactions to a transnational deficit in public 
confidence? What are the effects of specific sentencing arrangements on specific crime 
preventive goals? For example, the correctional value of prison and suspended sentences, 
1 Aubert, Om Straffens sosiale funsjon (Akademisk Forlag 1954), Lappi-Seppälä, Explaining Imprisonment 
in Europe, European Journal of Criminology 8, no. 4 (2011), Aas, Sentencing in the Age of Information. From 
Faust to Macintosh (GlassHouse Press 2005).
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of community service or youth sanctions?2 Second, empirical social science is increasing-
ly used as a theoretical and methodological framework to compare sentencing and other 
legal disciplines across countries.3 For example, by exploring if sentencing arrangements 
in Scandinavia are exceptions to otherwise widespread Western penal trends.4 Also, with 
social science comes a greater appreciation of the forms and techniques of transnational 
structures and how they interplay with local ones, leaving sentencing law and practice 
shaped by both.5
In this article, I investigate the most frequently used model in social scientific de-
scriptions of sentencing decision-making – the statistical causal model. After having de-
scribed the model and its characteristics, I identify and discuss three different aspects 
of sentencing decision-making that significantly challenge the usefulness of this model. 
My claim is that the model suffers from significant shortcomings. The model has a poor 
conception of law, it fails to grasp the dynamic processes through which facts and law 
are constructed, and it does not adapt to the rapidly changing organisational landscape 
of sentencing decision-making. Other and new models and methodologies should be 
brought to use.
2 The statistical causal model of sentencing decision-making
The primary function of most empirical descriptions of sentencing is to provide a reliable 
mirror in which sentencing law and policy can look to see if it recognises itself, if it likes 
what it sees, and if other and non-legal structures bear upon sentencing decision-mak-
ing. Is offence severity actually the most important sentencing determinant? Does eth-
nicity matter to the sentencing? Which sentencing ideologies actually drive judges? And 
2 Examples of this kind of Scandinavian research include Bondeson, Fangen i fångsamhället. Socialisation-
sprocesser vid ungdomsvårdsskola, ungdomsfängelse, fängelse och internering (Norstedt 1974), Clausen, 
Samfundstjeneste - virker det? (Djøfs Forlag 2007), Kjær, The Effects of Mixing Offenders with Non-Of-
fenders: Findings from a Danish Quasi Experiment, Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and 
Crime Prevention 12, no. 1 (2011), Tranæs and Geerdsen, Forbryderen og samfundet. Livsvilkår og uformel 
straf (Gyldendal 2008). Examples are also found in Kyvsgaard, Hvad virker - hvad virker ikke? (Djøfs Forlag 
2006). 
3 See Cotterell, Comparatists and Sociology, in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, eds. 
Legrand and Munday (Cambridge University Press 2003), Friedman, The Concept of Legal Culture, in 
Comparing Legal Cultures, ed. Nelken (Aldershot 1997), Nelken, ed., Comparative Criminal Justice and 
Globalization (Ashgate Publishing 2011). Concrete examples include Jones and Newburn, Comparative 
Criminal Justice Policy-Making in the United States and the United Kingdom. The Case of Private Prisons, 
British Journal of Criminology 45 (2005), Three Strikes and You’re Out. Exploring Symbol and Substance in 
American and British Crime Control Politics, British Journal of Criminology 46 (2006).
4 Lappi-Seppälä 2011, Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era of Penal Excess: Part I: The Nature and 
Roots of Scandinavian Exceptionalism, British Journal of Criminology 48, no. 3 (2008). See also Ugelvik and 
Dullum, Penal Exceptionalism? Nordic Prison Policy and Practice (Routledge 2012).
5 Nelken, ed., 2011.
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what effect, if any, do confessions have on the length of prison sentences? Is sentencing 
practice uniform between courts? 
Answers to these and other empirical questions of sentencing law and practice have 
become an accepted part of some legal research and of much policy-making. Method-
ologically, there are significant variations. Some studies use ethnographic approaches 
relying on qualitative and interpretative methods. Others, and by far the overwhelming 
majority of studies, continue to rely on quantitative and statistical methods designating 
sentencing decision-making as a causal relationship between fixed sentencing factors and 
sentencing outcomes. Through a variety of shapes and levels of complexity, the model 
plays the by far biggest descriptive role in sentencing research and policy.6 
The simple version – counting the type, number, and amount of sanctions for particu-
lar offences – is well known and has been practiced for more than a century. It continues 
to dominate empirical work in public policy making. In the last thirty to forty years, sta-
tistical descriptions have become more common in both research and in policy, more re-
liable, and much more detailed. With the advancement of practical statistical tools in the 
1960s, 70s, and 80s, and with the increased power of computers from the 80s onwards, 
multivariate statistical analysis (examining the relationship between multiple sentencing 
factors and the sentencing outcome) have become more mainstream to use.7 It is this ad-
vancement of practical statistical technologies that has made available current empirical 
descriptions of sentencing decision-making and the factors that determine its outcome. 
There is no question that the technical and methodological development from the 
empirical studies of von Eyben and Aubert in the 1950s and 60s to the later studies of 
Vestergaard in the 1980s, and again to the more recent studies of Kyvsgaard, BRÅ, Wan-
dall and Hinkkanen and Lappi-Seppälä in the 1990s and 2000s, is significant.8 Yet, the 
basic structure remains the same: A model of sentencing that measures the variation in 
sentencing outcome (type of sanction and size of sanction) as a function of variations in 
multiple sentencing factors. In the following I will refer to this model as ‘the statistical 
causal model’ or just ‘the model’.
6 See for example the overview of Scandinavian sentencing research in Hinkkanen and Lappi-Seppälä, Sen-
tencing Theory, Policy, and Research in the Nordic Countries, Crime and Justice 40, no. 1 (2011). 
7 Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge University Press 1990), Stigler, Statistics on the Table. The 
History of Statistical Concepts and Methods (Harvard University Press 2000).
8 Aubert, Krigsrettsdommene i militærnektersaker, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 69 (1956) and Straff og lag-
deling (University of Oslo 1963), BRÅ, Sannolikheten att dömas till fängelse. En Statistisk analys (Brotts-
förebyggande Rådet 2000), von Eyben, Strafudmåling (Gads Forlag 1950), Hinkkanen and Lappi-Seppälä 
2011, Kyvsgaard, Samfundstjeneste i empirisk belysning, Juristen 4 (1999), Vestergaard, Sanktionsundersø-
gelsen. Design og heuristik (University of Copenhagen 1982), Wandall 2004.
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The design of the model
Hogarth aptly describes this model of sentencing-decision making as a black box through 
which selected sentencing factors affect the outcome of sentencing decision-making.9 
What happens inside the black box is not clear. In some such models a few selected pro-
cedural factors are included to account for some of the processes between input and 
output factors. Models almost never account for the effect of variations between different 
kinds of sentencing institutions (court, prosecution, police), and almost never for the 
effect of variations between different courts or judges.10 
The typical trademark of the model is its pragmatic combination of quantitative 
methodology and causal logic. It uses quantitative methodology to study the correla-
tions between semantically pre-defined sentencing factors and pre-defined sentencing 
outcomes; and it relies on a logic of causality by assuming that statistical correlations 
between sentencing factors and outcome factors are causally related, when controlling for 
other possible correlations. For example, a categorically defined factor for ‘prior criminal 
record’ and its correlation with ‘length of imprisonment, measured in months’.11 
Sentencing factors
In describing sentencing decision-making this statistical causal model typically includes 
sentencing factors (variables) for the severity of crime, the prior criminal record, the per-
sonal circumstances of the defendant, and a few procedural circumstances, such as trial 
form and confession. Sometimes interaction effects between some variables are included 
in the analysis. 
The criminal offence is always included and with few exceptions follows officially rec-
ognised distinctions, e.g. value of stolen property, aggravated nature of violence, or the 
weight of illegal drugs. Though we do know that the effect of offences vary according to 
a range of different internal narratives, this is typically not reflected in the variables.12 
Hinkkanen and Lappi-Sepälä include a wide range of offence characteristics, extracted 
from written judgments. Yet, even that source is limited to what has actually been written 
down in official court documents, and is often not identical to all that was communicated 
during trial. 
The prior criminal record is typically constructed as a dichotomous variable (prior 
crime; no prior crime). In some studies, a second distinction between prior similar and 
prior different crime, is included. However, rarely, if ever, are other distinctions included. 
9 Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (University of Toronto Press 1971).
10 See further references in Wandall 2004 p. 155. See also Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg, Ideologi og 
grunnholdninger hos dommerne i Norges Høyesterett, Lov og Rett 51, no. 4 (2012).




The same goes for the difference in the effect that prior crime can be expected to have for 
different offence categories.13 
Personal and social circumstances of the defendant are often included in statistical 
causal models of sentencing. Age is typically included as a dichotomous variable (+/-18 
years of age). This does mirror the official discourse, but does not reflect the fact that sta-
tistical effects are found between different age groups too, or with the fact that the effect 
of age can be expected to vary with the effect of other variables (offence category, prior 
crime, gender). Other aspects of personal and social circumstances – income, education, 
family conditions, employment, social ties, etc. are more difficult to collect data on for 
practical methodological reasons. In models used in policy reports, such variables are al-
most never included. In research projects, attempts are more often made to capture useful 
indicators for such variables. BRÅ used an aggregate statistical construction of presence 
of mitigating circumstances.14 Kyvsgaard used available information about defendant’s 
’suitability for community service’, and Wandall used a range of indicators of social inte-
gration.15 Gender is included as a suspect category more and more often, as is ethnicity 
where numbers allow.16 
Fourth, procedural factors are increasingly included in empirical descriptions and 
modelling of sentencing decision-making. Trial form, confession, and length of trial 
are among the more often included. However, well-known interaction effects between 
offence-related variables and procedural variables are rarely included as are other and 
equally empirically relevant procedural factors. Among others, the latter includes partly 
withdrawal of charges, part confessions, and the use of pre-trial custody.17 
When it comes to the sentencing outcome, statistical causal models typically include 
the sanctions formally recognised as penal sanctions (conditioned charge withdrawal, 
fine, suspended sentences, combination sanctions, prison sanctions, etc.). Less often are 
procedural decisions and ancillary orders (e.g. confiscation, commercial disqualification, 
and other administrative orders), as well as monetary damages, included.
Statistical causal models bring enormous power to the description, analysis, and un-
derstanding of sentencing practices. Undoubtedly, they serve as an important tool in 
maintaining Scandinavian sentencing law and policy in an on-going dialogue with actual 
practices. Perhaps therefore it seems only natural to take a closer look at the design of this 
model and how it fares with empirical and theoretical challenges in the realm of sentenc-
13 Aubert 1963, Wandall 2004.
14 BRÅ 2000. 
15 Kyvsgaard 1999, Wandall 2004. 
16 Holmberg and Kyvsgaard, Are Immigrants and Their Descendants Discriminated against in the Danish 
Criminal Justice System?, Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 4, no. 2 
(2003).
17 Vestergaard 1982, Wandall 2004.
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ing. In the following I will focus on three empirical and theoretical challenges and discuss 
to what extent the statistical causal model is capable of responding to these.
3 The legal complexity of sentencing
The first challenge is about how the statistical causal model describes law and legal struc-
tures. Understanding how – not merely if – law matters in criminal sentencing has be-
come increasingly relevant. The number of qualitatively different statutory rules, official 
guidelines, managerial standards, court practice guidance, and other kinds of regulations 
are being produced in an unprecedented volume. The institutions involved in the produc-
tion of legal rules and standards are no longer merely legislature and courts, but also the 
police, the prosecution service, the department of correction and the many specialised 
departments that handle the wide range of different categories of cases. Any empirical 
ambition to describe sentencing and the structures that govern it requires a conception 
of law and legal structures that reflects this complexity. 
The assumption of the statistical causal model is that it is possible to describe legal 
factors using social scientific variables, and that we can distinguish between legal and 
extra-legal factors using empirical social science validity tests of statistical relationships. 
Hinkkanen and Lappi-Sepälä defend research based on this assumption in their account 
of Scandinavian sentencing: 
Extralegal coefficients should not be used in setting normative starting points for sentencing, so 
information on normative factors may be lost. Extralegal factors should be studied separately, by 
adding extralegal factors after the normative factors and structure are set.18
However intuitively straightforward this sounds, it is problematic. First of all, describing 
legal factors using social scientific categories involves a change in disciplinary discourse. 
We rarely take notice of these disciplinary changes – but we do make them. Max Weber, 
who famously associated legal norms with social control, wrote about this:
When we speak of ‘law’, ‘legal order’, or ‘legal proposition’, close attention must be paid to the 
distinction between the legal and the sociological points of view. 
... 
the ideal ‘legal order’ of legal theory has nothing directly to do with the world of real economic 
conduct, since both exist on different levels. One exists in the realm of the ‘ought’ while the other 
deals with the world of the ‘is’. If it is nevertheless said that the economic and the legal order are 
intimately related to one another, the latter is understood, not in the legal, but in the sociological 
sense, i.e., as being empirically valid.19
18 Hinkkanen and Lappi-Seppälä 2011 p. 311.
19 Weber, Economy and Society (University of California Press 1978), p. 311-312.
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However different from any contemporary theoretical position, Weber’s remark 
serves well to remind us that empirical social scientific descriptions are exactly that – so-
cial scientific and empirical. It is in this latter sense that statistical causal models describe 
sentencing decision-making. This means that the model uses a different test of validity 
to determine if a sentencing factor is relevant or not, than do law. In the statistical causal 
model the test is if there is a statistically probable correlation of relevance. In a traditional 
legal model the question is rather if there is a sufficient legal reference. The validity tests 
are different and one cannot deduce from one to the other. Think for example of the 
fact that while empirical studies have found that socio-economic marginalised groups of 
young men are targeted discriminatorily in sentencing, all the legal decisions that went 
into these empirical descriptions were typically upheld in court and when appealed, also 
on appeal. 
The second way in which this difference in disciplinary point of view is relevant, is 
that legal concepts do not have fixed meanings which can be translated into social scien-
tific statistical categories. When translated, an irreversible change or selection of meaning 
also takes place. This cannot be handled by a mere distinction between legal and extra-le-
gal factors. A legal category of ‘confession’, ‘risk’, ‘suitable for community service’, ‘youth’ 
may be carriers of a variety of different meanings into the sentencing process. When 
translated into statistical categories, these meanings are lost. This socio-legal reality is 
well described in the Danish police as well as in Danish courts.20 I will return to this 
below. 
Rather than seeing the statistical causal model as a tool to determine the relevance of 
legal and extra-legal factors, we should see the model as an irreversible translation of law 
into empirical social science. Despite its claim, the model cannot conclude anything about 
the law or legal structure of sentencing, but only about its social practice. And it cannot 
contribute to a better understanding of how law matters and how different regulatory 
techniques matter. 
There are several theoretical developments that can help to better understand the con-
nection between a social scientific description and law or legality. The strongest ones 
include the theory of structuration by Giddens (see for example the work of Henham), 
the theory of autopietic systems theory and its variations by Luhmann and Teubner (see 
for example the work of Aviram and of Wandall), and the reflexive matrix of sociology of 
20 Holmberg, Politiets skøn i retssociologisk belysning (University of Copenhagen: 1999) and Policing Stereo-
types. A Qualitative Study of Police Work in Denmark (Galda+Wilch Verlag 2003), Wandall 2004 and Deci-
sions to Imprison. Court Decision-Making Inside and Outside the Law, book series: Advances in Criminolo-
gy (Ashgate Publishing 2009).
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law by Banakar.21 It is only the aim here to mention their presence, not to discuss them. 
They are markedly different from one another, but do share an ability to understand – in 
different ways – the difference in discourse between a legal and a social scientific point 
of view and frame it in a theoretical approach. This involves accepting variable meaning 
structures in the process of legal decision-making in sentencing. Accordingly, sentencing 
is not only a matter of which factor or norm (offence severity, offender characteristics, 
confession, etc.), but also of what meanings these different norms and facts carry into the 
sentencing. 
The meanings of ’severity’, ’confession’, of ’mitigating circumstances’, or ’dangerous of-
fender’, may vary in decision-making while the norm remains the same. Every legal rule 
and every legal fact acquires its operational meaning in a given context and therefore 
varies. In the case of sentencing decision-making, meanings are constructed through the 
institutions and people who prepare the case, the prosecution, the court, in the dynamics 
of the courtroom, and the ethics of the local community. Descriptions of offence sever-
ity and personal circumstances are not given facts but are constructed in the process of 
investigation, prosecution, and court decision-making in the framework of a particular 
political, social and cultural context.22 That is what provides a sufficient fluidity for em-
pirical social scientific descriptions to tell one story about sentencing decision-making 
and the legal framework to uphold a different one. On this level of meaning structures 
there is an operation of sentencing that is invisible to the law, yet constitutive of how 
norms of legal sentencing decision-making operate. This is a perspective that allows us 
a more complex but also more reliable description of how law matters in sentencing – 
without simplifying law to a static norm and without denying law its normative character.
4 Sentencing as a process of constructing facts and law
The second challenge of the statistical causal model is that facts and law in sentencing 
decision-making are themselves products of the social constructions and institutional 
dynamics in the decision-making processes of the justice system. There is a longer and 
21 Aviram, Managing Disobedience as Crime: Legal and Extra-Legal Discourse in Addressing Unauthorized Ab-
sences and Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Israel (University of California at Berkeley 2005), 
Banakar, Merging Law and Sociology. Beyond the Dichotomies in Socio-Legal Research ( Galda+Wilch Verlag 
2002), Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of a Theory of Structuration (Polity Press 1984), Hen-
ham, Human Rights, Due Process, and Sentencing, British Journal of Criminology 38 (1998) and Problems 
of Theorizing Sentencing Research, International Journal of Sociology of Law 28 (2000), Luhmann, Das 
Recht Der Gesellschaft ( Suhrkamp 1993), Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System ( Blackwell 1993), Wandall 
2009.
22 Johansen, Livshistorier i straffesagen. Vidensprocesser om sigtedes person (University of Copenhagen 2012), 
Wandall, Resisting Risk Assessment? Pre-Sentence Reports and Individualized Sentencing in Denmark, 
Punishment and Society. The International Journal of Penology 12, no. 3 (2010).
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established tradition for this wider approach to study court decision-making.23 This par-
ticular approach shows that the legal rules and the facts that structure sentencing deci-
sion-making do not (only) derive their meanings from the law itself or from the facts 
as they are brought into the decision-making process, but (also) from the institutional, 
procedural and social context and dynamics of the legal decision-making. This is a com-
plexity that the statistical causal model of sentencing decision-making cannot handle, but 
nevertheless a complexity that is unavoidable. There does exist a handful of such studies 
in Scandinavia, but the number remains small, and we continue to have limited knowl-
edge of this aspect of sentencing decision-making.24 In the following I will look at one 
recent major contribution to illustrate.
Johansen’s ’Livshistorier i straffesagen’
Johansen studied the processes of constructing information about the individual offend-
er in the criminal process.25 The title of the study is ’Life stories in the criminal case. 
Knowledge processes about the defendant’s person’.26 Johansen uses the actor-network 
theory of Bruno Latour to show that facts about the individual offender are not merely 
established in the process as objective legal facts, but are integral parts of the networks 
of relations that exist between people, institutions, and knowledge in the decision-mak-
ing processes leading to criminal sentencing.27 There are several social constructivist ap-
proaches to this insight. Latour represents one of the most promising. According to his 
theory information gets translated and negotiated through the individual stages of the 
decision-making process and their internal and external dynamics. Facts are themselves 
resources of the internal dynamics and as such are also carriers of purposes in the pro-
23 See for example Bennet and Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom. Justice and Judgement in 
American Culture (Rutgers University Press 1984), Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Con-
seil D’etat (Polity Press 2010), McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice (MacMil-
lan 1981), Nelken, The Limits of the Legal Process. A Study of Landlords, Law, and Crime (Academic Press 
1983), Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice. Law as Culture in Islamic Society (Cambridge University Press 
1984) and The Justice of Islam (Oxford University Press 2000), Scheffer, Hannken-Illjes, and Kozin, Crim-
inal Defence and Procedure. Comparative Ethnographies in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United 
States (Palgrave MacMillan 2010).
24 Examples of related research in Scandinavia include Andenæs, ed., Kommunikasjon og rettssikkerhet. Ut-
lendingers og språklige minoriteters møte med politi og domstoler (Unipub 2000), Diesen, Lernestedt, and 
Lindholm, Liket inför lagen (Natur och Kultur 2005), Hald, Web without a Weaver: On the Becoming of 
Knowledge. A Study of Criminal Investigation in the Danish Police (Aarhus University 2010), Jakobsen, Le-
gitimitetens logik, institutionelle dilemmaer i det sociale klagesystem (University of Copenhagen 2004), Jo-
hansen 2012, Johansen and Stæhr, Lige for loven: En pilotundersøgelse af behandlingen af etniske minoriteter 
i straffesager (ICJ: 2007), Järvinen and Mik-Meyer, Indledning: at skabe en klient, in At skabe en klient: 
institutionelle identiteter i socialt arbejde, eds. Järvinen and Mik-Meyer (Hans Reitzels Forlag 2003), Kjus, 
Sakens fakta: fortellingsstrategier i straffesaker (Unipub, 2008), Wandall 2010.
25 Johansen 2012.
26 My translation. Title in Danish: ’Livshistorier i straffesagen. Vidensprocesser om sigtedes person’.
27 Latour 2010. 
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cess. The result is that sentencing decision-making cannot be understood in isolation 
from the agents and institutions involved in the processing of cases; most importantly the 
Department of Corrections, the police, the prosecution and the courts. In her empirical 
findings, Johansen shows how facts about the individual offender are constructed around 
different meanings of normality, integration, and suitability. In turn, these meanings are 
typically framed in a spectrum between the majority and minorities, between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and are tied to particular ways of looking at the relationship between the individ-
ual and society. Johansen describes how social and cultural distinctions take on central 
roles in defining these meaning-structures. For example, ‘risk’ is not just an evaluation of 
future crime, but also an evaluation of how normal the defendant is, as understood in the 
settings of the Danish networks and institutions under study. Johansen even shows how 
silence (cultural silence) allows meanings of cultural differences to enter the process of 
decision-making meaningfully.
What this and similar studies show is that law and fact, as meaningfully constructed in 
the process of sentencing, are tied to the dynamics of the processing, its actors and their 
interaction, and to the organisational, social and cultural context of the decision-making 
process. It is this fluidity of meanings of fact and law that the statistical causal model 
misses. In effect, the model can only represent one of many constructions of sentencing 
decision-making, leaving other ones undescribed. For example, an offender is not merely 
young or adult (+/- 18), but is within reach or not, morally immature or not, and there 
may be institutional interests in and cultural preferences for working with some youth 
and not others. Prior crime is not merely prior crime. It may convey different meanings 
for different offence categories and for different types of offenders, and it may be used for 
different strategic purposes during the criminal justice process.
Besides this general socio-legal consequence of this established insight, there are also 
specific Nordic consequences. Immigration has changed the cultural landscape and in-
troduced a new uncertainty in the everyday practice of criminal sentencing.28 The cul-
tural homogeneity, comparatively so characteristic for Scandinavian countries, has been 
replaced by a cultural heterogeneity – yet without the institutional languages to go with 
it.29 With this come the problems of language, shared meanings of facts and rules, as well 
as the procedural challenges of misunderstandings between the agents of the process. 
However, the more fundamental uncertainty is that cultural interpretations become part 
28 Højsgaard Andersen and Tranæs, Etniske minoriteters overrepræsentation i strafferetlige domme (Syddansk 
Universitetsforlag 2011), Sarnecki, Strukturell diskriminering i rättsväsendet på grund av etnisk och re-
ligiös tillhörighet. En introduktion och sammenfattning, in Är rättvisan rättvis? Tio perspectiv på diskrim-
inering av etniska och religiösa minoriteter inom rättssystemet, ed. Sarnecki, Utredningen om makt, inte-
gration och strukturell diskriminering (Statens Offenliga Utredningar 2006). 
29 This description is not meant to disregard the already existing plurality of cultures in Norway, Sweden and 
Finland. However, comparatively speaking, and considering the culturally different immigration, which all 
Scandinavian countries have experienced in the last twenty years, it is clear that criminal justice institutions 
today have to deal with a culturally more heterogeneous group of people than before. 
66
Wandall
of the process. All agents do not share a common meaning of a ‘confession’.30 That kind 
of uncertainty separates those who hold different understandings from each other, intro-
ducing social and cultural differences as operational distinctions in the decision-mak-
ing process. The most likely effect is that it reinforces the difference in identity between 
cultural and social groups of society, fuelling a cycle of partial distrust in the law and its 
institutions from those groups of people.31 Again, the challenge is not so much to study 
if law governs, but how law governs the decision-making process to accommodate these 
different social and cultural meanings without distancing any of them. This brings us to 
the third and final social scientific perspective of sentencing decision-making that I want 
to address: the organisational framework of sentencing. 
5 The formal organisation of sentencing
We know from decades of organisational research that courts in action, just like other le-
gal and non-legal institutions, take on a nature of their own.32 The actual social practices 
of courts, prosecution offices, and police offices will always differ from their formal ideal 
to some extent.33 Following this line of insight brings two developments to our attention, 
both of which challenge the statistical causal model of sentencing decision-making. 
First of all, while our legal scholarly focus continues to be the courts and in particular-
ly the upper courts, sentencing is moving down and out into new organisational settings. 
More cases are handled in the lower courts and more cases are handled by administrative 
agencies. The public prosecution finishes more cases than ever before. The police is by far 
the most frequent authority to hand down fines, and other departments – anything from 
environmental offices to departments of animal safety or social security – are instru-
mental in the processing, conviction and sentencing of offenders. Moreover, correctional 
30 Johansen and Stæhr 2007.
31 Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 
British Journal of Criminology 52, no. 6 (2012), Jackson and Sunshine, Public Confidence in Policing. A 
Neo-Durkheimian Perspective, British Journal of Criminology 47 (2007), Tyler and Huo, Trust in the Law. 
Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (Russel Sage Foundation 2002).
32 Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, American Sociological Review 1, no. 
6 (1936), Selznick, Leadership in Administration (University of California Press 1984). In the sociology of 
law the equivalent is championed by Roscoe Pound as a difference between the law in the book and law in 
action, and by Eugen Ehrlich as a difference between norms of decision and norms of conduct (living law).
33 Some of the more famous accounts of courts and sentencing include Church, Examining Local Legal Cul-
ture, American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1985), Eisenstein and Jacob, Felony Justice (Little Brown 
1977), Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment (Russel Sage Foundation 1979), Nelken 1983, Rock, The Social 
World of an English Crown Court. Witness and Professionals in the Crown Court Centre at Wood Green 
(Clarendon Press 1993), Ulmer, Social Worlds of Sentencing. Court Communities under Sentencing Guide-
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departments – like earlier in the twentieth century – govern decisions about sanctioning 
that could otherwise have been handled by the courts. For example, community service 
in Sweden and electronic monitoring in Denmark. And perhaps most importantly, some 
cases are referred to alternative and semi-legal institutions, most significantly institutions 
for alternative dispute resolution. The current use of statistical causal models of sentenc-
ing shows little appreciation of these shifts in organisational frameworks and the chang-
es in social practice that follow. Not only do we know too little about the institutional 
framework within which courts practice – we know even less about the framework in 
which sentencing is carried out in the many other places where it actually does take place.
Second, we know from many empirical studies that sentencing varies between courts 
and that it varies between judges.34 Nevertheless, the statistical causal model assumes 
uniformity in sentencing practices between courts and judges. Furthermore, we know 
that sentencing actually reflects social norms in daily practices of courts, and yet these 
are never accounted for in any of the sources of typical statistical casual models. Instead, 
sources of variables are often guided by the practical availability of data and the mod-
elling guided by the statistical need to reduce the number of variables and categories 
to increase the overall explanatory power of the statistical model. The result is a close 
connection between the formal organisation of sentencing and the choice and construc-
tion of variables in the model. For example, there is a rough variable for offence category 
corresponding to the formal category of offence severity; there are rough variables for 
age and prior crime, corresponding to the equivalent formal categories, and there may 
be a variable of confession, corresponding to the defendant’s confession to the crime, as 
described in the final judgment. But if this is the original full confession – which it rarely 
is – is not considered in the model. 
So, while it must be recognised that more and more sentencing law relates to empiri-
cally based policy work and more and more statistical studies are made of sentencing, it 
can be argued that the same empirical descriptions remain aligned with the existing for-
mal legal framework of sentencing decision-making. The statistical causal models may be 
very useful for organisational planning and for alignment with existing legal frameworks, 
but the power of this statistical causal model to produce empirically reliable descriptions, 
and to confront and challenge formal assumptions of sentencing decision-making, lacks.
6 Conclusion
The still most widely used model to describe actual sentencing decision-making is that 
of a statistical causal model. The argument advanced in this article is that this model, its 
design and construction of variables, needs a stronger empirical foundation. Further-
more, the article argues for a more balanced use of other and different social scientific 
34 BRÅ 2000, von Eyben 1950, Wandall 2004.
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methodologies to describe sentencing decision-making and the role of legal guidance in 
sentencing.
The statistical causal model needs to loosen its close ties with the formal construc-
tion of sentencing and instead look for a more empirically based design of its choice 
and construction of variables. Furthermore, descriptions of sentencing decision-making 
needs to be more open to the procedural aspects of how facts and law are constructed 
in the decision-making and should invite for a better understanding of the construction 
of meanings that takes place and that provide a significant framework for sentencing 
decision-making. The statistical causal model should come to terms with its inability to 
confront the legality of sentencing from a legal point of view and instead invite different 
models to provide a better grasp of the more complex relationship between empirical 
social scientific views of sentencing and a legal one. The increasing complex landscape 
of legal rules and regulatory standards of sentencing makes this all the more important. 
Moreover, the statistical causal model should reflect key institutional changes in the or-
ganisational framework of sentencing.
The statistical causal model has earlier provided a key platform for challenging how 
law described sentencing decision-making. The model continues to offer useful descrip-
tions and analysis of a variety of perspectives of sentencing. Nevertheless, there are im-
portant aspects of sentencing that we cannot observe with the current widespread use 
of statistical causal modelling. A widening in methodology and in conceptualisation of 
sentencing decision-making would be a welcome development.
